GD

What it would cost to take over the entire firm (equity plus debt, less cash) per dollar of pre-interest, pre-tax, pre-depreciation operating earnings. Capital-structure-agnostic — directly comparable across heavily and lightly levered businesses, which a P/E can't do. The weakness: EBITDA ignores capex, so capital-intensive businesses look artificially cheap on this metric. Cross-check with EV/FCF when capex is meaningful.

Adjusts the numerator for debt and cash so heavily-levered or cash-rich companies become comparable on a revenue-multiple basis. Particularly useful for cross-industry valuation work where some firms run net cash and others carry meaningful debt loads. Same caveats as P/S: best read alongside gross margin to translate the multiple into expected steady-state earnings power.

Share price divided by per-share book value of common equity — what the market values the franchise at versus what the accountants say it's worth on paper. Most informative for asset-heavy businesses (banks, insurers, industrials) where book value approximates a liquidation floor; far less informative for asset-light franchises whose value sits in brand, software, or other intangibles that GAAP under-states or excludes entirely.

How many dollars of share price the market is willing to pay for one dollar of trailing-twelve-month earnings. The universal valuation anchor for profitable companies — useful for cross-sector comparison and as a quick read on whether the market expects earnings growth, decline, or a quality re-rating. Sensitive to one-off items in the denominator (write-downs, tax holidays, share buybacks); pair with EV/EBITDA when capital structure or non-cash charges look noisy.

Useful when earnings are negative, noisy, or one-time-distorted (early-stage growth, restructurings, cyclical troughs). Works best within an industry, not across — gross margin profiles vary so wildly that 1x P/S for a software company means something completely different from 1x P/S for a grocery chain.

Peter Lynch's adjustment to PEG: adds the dividend yield to the growth rate in the denominator so that mature dividend payers don't get unfairly punished by a low growth rate alone. Sweet spot is 1.0 (P/E equals growth plus yield); below 0.5 often signals a broken growth assumption rather than genuine value; above 2 is over-paying.

Productivity of the asset base — how efficiently the firm converts assets into sales. Combined with net margin, this is the core of the DuPont decomposition: ROA = net margin × asset turnover. Two businesses can land at the same ROA via opposite paths: thin-margin / high-turnover (Costco, supermarkets) vs. fat-margin / low-turnover (luxury, software).

Sanity-check on earnings quality — a ratio of 1.0 means every dollar of GAAP earnings shows up as free cash flow. Persistently below 1.0 means working-capital build or capex is consuming earnings; persistently above 1.0 is unusual and may flag accounting conservatism (heavy non-cash charges) or a one-time release. Trend matters more than absolute level.

Operating margin minus interest, tax, and below-the-line items. Useful but noisier than operating margin: tax rate changes, debt-service shifts, and one-time items can move net margin year-over-year even when the operating business is unchanged. Always pair with operating margin and FCF margin — divergence between them is a tell about leverage, tax structure, or earnings quality.

Captures the leverage between revenue and operating profit — the core test of whether a business converts sales into income at the operating level. Independent of capital structure (excludes interest) and tax-jurisdiction noise. Trend matters as much as level: an improving operating margin indicates pricing power or operational efficiency gains; a falling margin signals input-cost pressure, wage inflation, or competitive erosion.

The headline profitability metric. Net income divided by average book equity tells you how productive each dollar of shareholders' capital is. High sustained ROE compounds book value when the business can reinvest at a similar return. Two warnings: ROE rises mechanically with leverage (high D/E inflates ROE without making the business better), and aggressive buybacks can shrink the equity denominator faster than they shrink earnings, artificially boosting ROE even as fundamental returns are flat.

Useful complement to debt-to-equity. Banks, REITs, and post-buyback firms can carry small or even negative book equity, which makes D/E unstable; D/A stays well-behaved because total assets is always positive. Industry context still matters — utilities run higher than software by design — but the comparability across capital structures is much better.

How much the company funds itself with debt vs. equity. Higher leverage amplifies both returns (through ROE) and risk (through interest coverage and refinancing exposure). The 'right' level varies enormously by industry — utilities and REITs run higher than industrials, software runs near zero. Becomes unstable when book equity is small or negative; complement with debt-to-assets in those cases.

Strips out short-term operating debt and revolver use to focus on the permanent capital structure. Useful when comparing companies that fund working capital differently — a high D/E that's mostly short-term commercial paper means something different from a high D/E that's mostly long-dated bonds. Watch refinancing maturities alongside the level.

Bond covenants are commonly written against this ratio because it directly answers 'how many years of operating cash earnings would it take to retire all the debt?' Above ~5x is high-yield territory for industrials; investment-grade industrials typically run below 3x. Negative net debt (more cash than debt) means the firm could pay off its bonds and still hold cash — a common position for mature tech.

How long the average sale sits as a receivable before becoming cash. Earnings-quality flag: receivables growing faster than revenue is one of the cleanest tells for revenue recognition stretching — Beneish flagged exactly this pattern as a primary fraud indicator. Industry context matters: B2B / project businesses run longer DSO than retail, but the trend is more important than the level.

Sustainability check on the dividend yield. Below 30% means the dividend has substantial room to grow; 30–60% is the conventional sweet spot for a mature payer; above 85% is stretched and frequently precedes a cut. REITs and utilities run higher than the broad market by design — REIT payouts above 80% are normal because the structure requires distributing most income.

Captures the full cash return to shareholders — dividends plus share repurchases, expressed as a percentage of market cap. Buyback-heavy issuers (Apple, Alphabet) hide their real cash return behind a low headline dividend yield; total shareholder yield surfaces it. Increasingly the right lens for evaluating capital-return quality, especially for tech-era large-caps that prefer buybacks to dividends.

Edward Altman's 1968 five-factor distress signal, originally calibrated against US public manufacturers that went bankrupt vs. those that didn't. Above 3.0 is the conventional 'safe' zone, 1.8–3.0 is the grey zone, below 1.8 historically associates with elevated bankruptcy risk within two years. Less reliable for non-manufacturing businesses, financial firms, and asset-light franchises — but the conceptual frame (liquidity + profitability + leverage cushion) translates broadly.

Joseph Piotroski's 2000 score for distinguishing winners from losers among low-P/B value stocks. Asks nine yes/no questions across profitability (4 questions), leverage and liquidity (3 questions), and operating efficiency (2 questions); each 'yes' adds one point. The original study found that high-F-score value stocks meaningfully outperformed low-F-score value stocks, suggesting it's a useful filter for separating real value from value traps.

Richard Sloan's 1996 accruals-quality measure. Persistent positive accruals (net income meaningfully exceeds cash flow) tend to mean-revert via earnings disappointments — Sloan documented that high-accruals firms underperform low-accruals firms over the following year. Large negative values are usually fine but can flag one-time working-capital releases or non-cash drags. Phase D-2 made this a target-window metric centred on zero.

Designed to buy oversold pullbacks within an established uptrend (price above the 200-day SMA). Uses a 2-period RSI rather than the standard 14 to make it hyper-responsive to short-term swings. Holds while RSI(2) is below an exit threshold and exits when RSI(2) crosses above 60 — a classic 1–4 day mean-reversion trade. Whipsaws hard outside an uptrend regime, hence the regime filter.

+1 when price is above regime_ma and RSI(2) drops below oversold; held while inside the trade; back to 0 when RSI(2) crosses above exit.

+1 = pullback-buy state active, 0 = flat. Bear-side variant uses the symmetric short rule.

Fires on the bar where the MACD line (EMA12 minus EMA26) crosses through the signal line (EMA9 of MACD). Bullish when MACD crosses up through signal, bearish when it crosses down. Far more commonly used as a trade trigger than divergence — see macd_divergence for the slower confirmatory tell. Whipsaws in chop; cleanest when combined with a trend-regime filter.

+1 on bullish cross (MACD crosses up through signal); -1 on bearish cross (MACD crosses down through signal); 0 otherwise.

+1 = bullish MACD-signal cross, -1 = bearish MACD-signal cross.