INTU

What it would cost to take over the entire firm (equity plus debt, less cash) per dollar of pre-interest, pre-tax, pre-depreciation operating earnings. Capital-structure-agnostic — directly comparable across heavily and lightly levered businesses, which a P/E can't do. The weakness: EBITDA ignores capex, so capital-intensive businesses look artificially cheap on this metric. Cross-check with EV/FCF when capex is meaningful.

Adjusts the numerator for debt and cash so heavily-levered or cash-rich companies become comparable on a revenue-multiple basis. Particularly useful for cross-industry valuation work where some firms run net cash and others carry meaningful debt loads. Same caveats as P/S: best read alongside gross margin to translate the multiple into expected steady-state earnings power.

Share price divided by per-share book value of common equity — what the market values the franchise at versus what the accountants say it's worth on paper. Most informative for asset-heavy businesses (banks, insurers, industrials) where book value approximates a liquidation floor; far less informative for asset-light franchises whose value sits in brand, software, or other intangibles that GAAP under-states or excludes entirely.

How many dollars of share price the market is willing to pay for one dollar of trailing-twelve-month earnings. The universal valuation anchor for profitable companies — useful for cross-sector comparison and as a quick read on whether the market expects earnings growth, decline, or a quality re-rating. Sensitive to one-off items in the denominator (write-downs, tax holidays, share buybacks); pair with EV/EBITDA when capital structure or non-cash charges look noisy.

Useful when earnings are negative, noisy, or one-time-distorted (early-stage growth, restructurings, cyclical troughs). Works best within an industry, not across — gross margin profiles vary so wildly that 1x P/S for a software company means something completely different from 1x P/S for a grocery chain.

Divides the trailing P/E by the annualised three-year EPS growth rate (in percentage points). Below 1.0 is conventionally read as 'cheap relative to growth'; above 2 implies the multiple is well ahead of recent growth. Sensitive to which growth window you choose and unstable when earnings cross zero — flips sign or explodes when prior EPS is negative.

Peter Lynch's adjustment to PEG: adds the dividend yield to the growth rate in the denominator so that mature dividend payers don't get unfairly punished by a low growth rate alone. Sweet spot is 1.0 (P/E equals growth plus yield); below 0.5 often signals a broken growth assumption rather than genuine value; above 2 is over-paying.

Lower is generally better for shareholder cash returns — less of every dollar of revenue gets reinvested in maintaining the asset base. But very low values can flag under-investment in a capital-intensive business, which catches up later via deteriorating capacity or competitiveness. Pairs with FCF margin to separate 'thin operating margin' from 'fat operating margin offset by heavy capex'.

Capital-efficiency measure that ignores how the assets are financed. Useful for comparing within a sector but heavily biased by industry — banks and utilities run low ROA by design (huge balance sheets), software and franchise businesses run high ROA (asset-light). The DuPont decomposition links it to ROE: ROE = ROA × (assets / equity) × (1/(1-tax)), so leverage inflates the gap between ROA and ROE.

Bottom-line growth on a per-share basis — captures both operating progress and any net buyback effect. The denominator uses the absolute value of prior EPS so a turnaround from negative to positive earnings reads with the conventional sign rather than producing arithmetic nonsense. Pair with revenue growth to separate real franchise expansion from buyback-driven per-share lift.

Useful complement to debt-to-equity. Banks, REITs, and post-buyback firms can carry small or even negative book equity, which makes D/E unstable; D/A stays well-behaved because total assets is always positive. Industry context still matters — utilities run higher than software by design — but the comparability across capital structures is much better.

How much the company funds itself with debt vs. equity. Higher leverage amplifies both returns (through ROE) and risk (through interest coverage and refinancing exposure). The 'right' level varies enormously by industry — utilities and REITs run higher than industrials, software runs near zero. Becomes unstable when book equity is small or negative; complement with debt-to-assets in those cases.

Strips out short-term operating debt and revolver use to focus on the permanent capital structure. Useful when comparing companies that fund working capital differently — a high D/E that's mostly short-term commercial paper means something different from a high D/E that's mostly long-dated bonds. Watch refinancing maturities alongside the level.

Bond covenants are commonly written against this ratio because it directly answers 'how many years of operating cash earnings would it take to retire all the debt?' Above ~5x is high-yield territory for industrials; investment-grade industrials typically run below 3x. Negative net debt (more cash than debt) means the firm could pay off its bonds and still hold cash — a common position for mature tech.

How long the average sale sits as a receivable before becoming cash. Earnings-quality flag: receivables growing faster than revenue is one of the cleanest tells for revenue recognition stretching — Beneish flagged exactly this pattern as a primary fraud indicator. Industry context matters: B2B / project businesses run longer DSO than retail, but the trend is more important than the level.

Sustainability check on the dividend yield. Below 30% means the dividend has substantial room to grow; 30–60% is the conventional sweet spot for a mature payer; above 85% is stretched and frequently precedes a cut. REITs and utilities run higher than the broad market by design — REIT payouts above 80% are normal because the structure requires distributing most income.

Edward Altman's 1968 five-factor distress signal, originally calibrated against US public manufacturers that went bankrupt vs. those that didn't. Above 3.0 is the conventional 'safe' zone, 1.8–3.0 is the grey zone, below 1.8 historically associates with elevated bankruptcy risk within two years. Less reliable for non-manufacturing businesses, financial firms, and asset-light franchises — but the conceptual frame (liquidity + profitability + leverage cushion) translates broadly.

Joseph Piotroski's 2000 score for distinguishing winners from losers among low-P/B value stocks. Asks nine yes/no questions across profitability (4 questions), leverage and liquidity (3 questions), and operating efficiency (2 questions); each 'yes' adds one point. The original study found that high-F-score value stocks meaningfully outperformed low-F-score value stocks, suggesting it's a useful filter for separating real value from value traps.

Richard Sloan's 1996 accruals-quality measure. Persistent positive accruals (net income meaningfully exceeds cash flow) tend to mean-revert via earnings disappointments — Sloan documented that high-accruals firms underperform low-accruals firms over the following year. Large negative values are usually fine but can flag one-time working-capital releases or non-cash drags. Phase D-2 made this a target-window metric centred on zero.

Fires on the bar where the MACD line (EMA12 minus EMA26) crosses through the signal line (EMA9 of MACD). Bullish when MACD crosses up through signal, bearish when it crosses down. Far more commonly used as a trade trigger than divergence — see macd_divergence for the slower confirmatory tell. Whipsaws in chop; cleanest when combined with a trend-regime filter.

+1 on bullish cross (MACD crosses up through signal); -1 on bearish cross (MACD crosses down through signal); 0 otherwise.

+1 = bullish MACD-signal cross, -1 = bearish MACD-signal cross.