FTNT

What it would cost to take over the entire firm (equity plus debt, less cash) per dollar of pre-interest, pre-tax, pre-depreciation operating earnings. Capital-structure-agnostic — directly comparable across heavily and lightly levered businesses, which a P/E can't do. The weakness: EBITDA ignores capex, so capital-intensive businesses look artificially cheap on this metric. Cross-check with EV/FCF when capex is meaningful.

Valuation expressed against the cash actually available to all capital providers after capex. Often more honest than EV/EBITDA when capital expenditure is meaningful relative to depreciation, because EBITDA ignores capex entirely while FCF reflects it. The cleanest single-number 'what would I pay to own this whole business?' valuation lens for capital-intensive firms.

Adjusts the numerator for debt and cash so heavily-levered or cash-rich companies become comparable on a revenue-multiple basis. Particularly useful for cross-industry valuation work where some firms run net cash and others carry meaningful debt loads. Same caveats as P/S: best read alongside gross margin to translate the multiple into expected steady-state earnings power.

The multiple equity analysts most commonly quote because it reflects expected earnings rather than the trailing window. Same caveats as trailing P/E plus one extra: the denominator depends on consensus estimates, which can be systematically optimistic going into a downturn or pessimistic at a cyclical trough. Worth cross-checking against trailing P/E and sell-side estimate trend.

An ABSOLUTE intrinsic-value signal, distinct from the relative multiples (PE, EV/EBITDA) which only compare a stock to its industry peers. Intrinsic value comes from the Residual Income Model: book value plus the present value of the residual income (earnings above a charge for the cost of equity) the firm is forecast to generate. This is the best-VALIDATED absolute value signal in the academic literature (Frankel & Lee 1998, replicated through 2026): the value-to-price ratio robustly predicts 1-3 year cross-sectional returns, survives every major factor model, and subsumes book-to-market. Because it is scored across the WHOLE universe (not within-industry), it complements the relative multiples rather than double-counting them. Pair it with a quality screen (Piotroski) to avoid value traps, and read the EPV decomposition to see whether a discount is unpriced earnings power or just speculative growth coming out of the price. One caveat: the model anchors on book equity, so for low-book, buyback-heavy, or asset-light firms (think Apple or Coca-Cola) book is a poor floor and the model can read durable franchises as wildly overvalued. Readings are clamped, and the metric is currently shadow-scored — shown for context, with zero weight in the fundamentals grade — pending validation.

Share price divided by per-share book value of common equity — what the market values the franchise at versus what the accountants say it's worth on paper. Most informative for asset-heavy businesses (banks, insurers, industrials) where book value approximates a liquidation floor; far less informative for asset-light franchises whose value sits in brand, software, or other intangibles that GAAP under-states or excludes entirely.

Useful when earnings are negative, noisy, or one-time-distorted (early-stage growth, restructurings, cyclical troughs). Works best within an industry, not across — gross margin profiles vary so wildly that 1x P/S for a software company means something completely different from 1x P/S for a grocery chain.

Divides the trailing P/E by the year-over-year EPS growth rate (in percentage points). Below 1.0 is conventionally read as 'cheap relative to growth'; above 2 implies the multiple is well ahead of recent growth. Sensitive to which growth window you choose and unstable when earnings cross zero — flips sign or explodes when prior EPS is negative.

Free cash flow the business throws off, divided by what the market currently charges for the equity. Treats the equity claim as a perpetual stream of free cash. More honest than earnings yield because it reflects the cash actually available to shareholders after all reinvestment. Cyclicals can swing below zero in a downturn — read with the trailing-cycle range.

Pre-capex version of cash conversion: compares operating cash flow directly to net income, before subtracting capex. Numbers persistently below 1.0 suggest accruals are doing the work (revenue recognised before cash collected, or expenses deferred). Numbers above 1.0 are typically driven by D&A exceeding true economic depreciation — a mild positive sign but not always meaningful.

Captures the leverage between revenue and operating profit — the core test of whether a business converts sales into income at the operating level. Independent of capital structure (excludes interest) and tax-jurisdiction noise. Trend matters as much as level: an improving operating margin indicates pricing power or operational efficiency gains; a falling margin signals input-cost pressure, wage inflation, or competitive erosion.

Bottom-line growth on a per-share basis — captures both operating progress and any net buyback effect. The denominator uses the absolute value of prior EPS so a turnaround from negative to positive earnings reads with the conventional sign rather than producing arithmetic nonsense. Pair with revenue growth to separate real franchise expansion from buyback-driven per-share lift.

The single best operations-quality metric. Negative CCC means the firm is funded by suppliers — the customer pays before the supplier needs to be paid (Apple, Costco, Amazon at scale). Long CCC ties up working capital and forces operating-loan dependence. Combines three sub-metrics: days inventory outstanding, days sales outstanding, days payable outstanding.

How long the average sale sits as a receivable before becoming cash. Earnings-quality flag: receivables growing faster than revenue is one of the cleanest tells for revenue recognition stretching — Beneish flagged exactly this pattern as a primary fraud indicator. Industry context matters: B2B / project businesses run longer DSO than retail, but the trend is more important than the level.

DuPont productivity measure. Combined with margin, it tells the asset-light vs. asset-heavy story: low turnover with high margin is the luxury / branded model, high turnover with thin margin is the supermarket / discount model. Very high turnover in retail can also flag stockouts (lost sales) — the metric reads best industry-relative, not absolute.

Net income divided by market cap, expressed as a percent. Lets you compare equity earning power directly to bond yields: a 6% earnings yield is the equity-side analog to a 6% coupon, with the difference that earnings can grow (or contract) while a bond coupon is fixed. The standard 'is the equity risk-premium adequate?' framing.